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THE RISE OF SCHOOL-SUPPORTING NONPROFITS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines voluntary contributions to public education via charitable school 
foundations, booster clubs and PTAs/PTOs as an alternative to local revenues generated via the 
property tax. We employ panel data on school-supporting charities with national coverage from 
1995 to 2010, which we geocode and match to school districts. We first document the meteoric 
rise of school-supporting nonprofits during this panel, and then estimate a series of regression 
models including both reduced-form and fixed effects specifications to examine the 
distributional consequences of voluntary distributions. We find that districts with higher per-
pupil expenditures and higher enrollments are more likely to have one or more operating school-
supporting charities, but that the level of per-pupil voluntary contributions declines with student 
enrollment. Higher-poverty school districts are less likely to be served by a school-supporting 
nonprofit and receive significantly lower voluntary contributions on a per-pupil basis. Finally, 
impressive recent growth in the number and financial size of these school supporting charities 
since 1995 has not offset reductions in state aid. Moreover, we do not find sufficient evidence to 
conclude that voluntary contributions change the distribution of funding across school districts 
and undo school finance equalization. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The recent fiscal crisis triggered major changes in the funding of K-12 public education. State 
tax receipts—which account for between 40 and 50 percent of revenues flowing to public 
schools—have declined by 12 percent in real terms since the start of the Great Recession in 2008 
and constitute the sharpest decline on record (McNichol, Oliff and Johnson 2012). The 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act temporarily offset these reductions in state aid by 
allocating $50 billion in federal stimulus to public schools, but such infusions of federal funding 
are unlikely to continue in light of the current fiscal and political climate (Reschovsky 2013). 
Johnson and Leachman (2013) find that five years following the start of the Great Recession, 
state tax receipts remain five percent lower in inflation-adjusted terms than at the start. If federal 
and state aid to public education continues to decline, local government revenues will play an 
increasingly important role in offsetting these reductions and responding to pressures for 
increased levels of K-12 funding.  
Property taxes currently generate over 80 percent of local own-source revenues for public 
schools (National Center for Education Statistics 2013; Reschovsky 2013). However, local 
governments often are unable to increase the level of property tax revenues flowing to local 
public schools due to state-level policies including property tax limitations, school finance 
equalization measures, and categorical funding requirements mandating the allocation of local 
revenues. These restrictions contribute to government failure, in which the level of public 
education spending in many school districts is lower than what many households are willing to 
pay. To increase school spending to desired levels, local governments often must rely on 
alternatives to the property tax such as sales taxes or voluntary contributions.   
This paper examines voluntary contributions to public education as an alternative to local 
revenues generated via the property tax. We employ panel data on charitable contributions to 
public school districts to answer the following research questions:  
1. How have voluntary contributions to public schools changed from 1995 through 2010?  
2. What are the distributional consequences of voluntary contributions to public schools? 
We address this research question by modeling both the probability that a school district 
receives revenues from a school-supporting 501(c)(3) charity as well as the level of per-
pupil voluntary contributions as a function of school district characteristics.  
3. To what extent do voluntary contributions offset reductions in state aid to public schools? 
We address this research question by modeling per-pupil voluntary contributions as a 
function of changes in state aid contributions and other school district characteristics.  
4. Is the recent rise in voluntary contributions sufficiently substantial to change the 
distribution of funding across school districts and to undo school finance equalization?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we position our paper 
within the prior literature and the current policy context. Section 3 describes our data sources. 
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 address research questions 1-4 above, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Voluntary Contributions to Public Services 
 
The topic of voluntary contributions to public services is well-explored. Brunner and Sonstelie 
(2003) provide an excellent review of several economic models of voluntary contributions. To 
summarize, these models include the “pure altruism” model in which an individual’s voluntary 
contributions reflect the purely altruistic motivation to improve the provision of public goods 
(see Olson and Zeckhauser 1996; Warr 1983; Roberts 1984; and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 
1986) and joint-product models in which voluntary contributions produce both public goods and 
private goods benefiting the benefactor, such as “warm glow” and prestige (see Cornes and 
Sandler 1984; Andreoni 1988; Andreoni 1989; Andreoni 1990; Ledyard 1995; Sugden 1982; 
Steinberg 1987; Glazer and Konrad 1996; and Harbaugh 1998). Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) 
empirically test and find evidence for their own model of partial cooperation in which some 
households free-ride off the voluntary contributions of others, and increases in voluntary 
contributions do not keep pace with proportional increases in the beneficiary base (i.e., the 
elasticity of donations with respect to the number of beneficiaries is less than one). 
During economic recessions, voluntary contributions may arise to address government failure 
to provide the desired level of public services. Even in the best of times, demand heterogeneity is 
natural, and devolving the choice of public services to the median voter’s preference (or, in the 
case of school finance equalization, to state Supreme Court decisions) leaves some citizens 
unsatisfied.  Because they are fairly easy to form in the U.S., nonprofit organizations provide a 
ready vehicle for collective action wherein communities can increase spending to desired levels 
(Lecy and Van Slyke 2013; Matsunaga and Yamauchi 2004; Salamon 1987; Young 1999). 
Voluntary contributions aimed at addressing government failure may be motivated via any of 
economic models described above. 
The overlapping fields of public and nonprofit management explain the voluntary sector’s 
participation in public service provision primarily through the lens of co-production. The study 
of co-production or citizen co-provision of public services began in the 1980s, during another 
recessionary era (see Brudney 1987, Parks et al. 1981, and Warren 1987). Traditionally, co-
production theory characterizes the citizen provision of public services as an activity in which 
citizens serve as both users and agents of service provision (Brudney and England 1983; 
Whitaker 1980; Parks et al. 1981). Historically, such activity has been explained via theories of 
government failure and cross-sectoral interdependence, which create the conditions for active 
government encouragement of charitable activity.  Examples can also be seen in the 
philanthropic institutions that support many public libraries, parks, and emergency services. The 
discussion has been renewed in recent years (e.g., Brandsen and Karré 2011; Jetté and 
Vaillancourt 2011; Mizrahi 2011). For example, Lecy and Van Slyke (2013) and Matsunaga and 
Yamauchi (2004) examine how and where 501(c)(3) charitable entities form, and what 
relationship they have with the characteristics of their host jurisdictions. Cohen (2012) and 
O’Toole and Meier (2004) examine the impact of co-production on revenue streams and tax 
policy, and Paarlberg and Gen (2009) examine whether disparities in community philanthropic 
resources result in public service inequities. Several studies in public and nonprofit management 
question whether voluntary contributions form a sufficient and sustainable solution to 
government failure. Irwin and Carr (2005) find that voluntary contributions are a “minor and 
highly variable source of revenue” and “an ill-suited replacement for broad-based tax revenue” 
(p. 33). Similarly, Lecy	  and	  Van	  Slyke	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  revenues	  from	  philanthropic	  sources	  do	  constitute	  a	  stable	  source	  of	  funding	  for	  public	  institutions:	  “foundations	  can	  be	  fickle	  patrons	  as	  they	  may	  prefer	  to	  support	  new	  organizations,	  new	  programs,	  and	  themes	  that	  evolve	  over	  time	  and	  within	  a	  community”	  (p.	  206).	  	  	  
 
Voluntary Contributions to Public Schools 
Hansen (2008) lists a broad range of nongovernmental organizations—both nonprofit and for-
profit—providing revenues to schools: “school-based organizations (parent associations, alumni 
associations, booster clubs), school foundations, local education funds, community foundations, 
local businesses, independent foundations, and corporations” (p. 315).4 Research on voluntary 
contributions to public schools primarily focuses on nonprofits classified as “charities” under 
Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code, sometimes referred to in the school context as education 
support organizations, or ESOs (e.g., Lampkin and Stern 2003). Referred to in this paper using 
the vernacular term “nonprofit”, these school-supporting charitable organizations include Parent 
Teacher Associations (PTAs), Parent Teacher Organizations (PTOs), alumni associations, 
booster clubs, school foundations, and local endowments which operate at the local school or 
district level and form the most prevalent examples of supplementary philanthropic activity in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Zimmer, Krop and Brewer (2003) use slightly different categorizations to characterize the voluntary contributions 
of nongovernmental organizations to California public schools. 
public education (Hansen 2008). These nonprofits obtain voluntary contributions via 
membership dues, earned income, philanthropic gifts and other fundraising activities, and may 
use these contributions to support general school and district operations or to finance particular 
programs. These school-supporting nonprofits are distinct from local education funds, 
community foundations, and independent foundations, which do not necessarily support K-12 
public education at the local level. Local education funds “operate on a district, regional, or 
statewide level and act independently of the schools and districts themselves” and aim to achieve 
systematic education reforms rather than to provide local support for specific schools or districts 
(Hansen 2008, p. 317). Community foundations operate grants-based programs intended to 
address a broad set of community concerns and do not limit their programs to the support of 
public schools. Independent foundations are private philanthropic organizations that support K-
12 education; independent foundations usually do not operate at a local school or district level, 
and funding often is allocated toward research or advocacy (Hansen 2008).  
As Hansen (2008) and Greene (2005) document, there are a number of challenges in 
estimating the level and distribution of voluntary contributions to public education. Some studies 
of voluntary contributions use financial data from tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, reported 
to the Internal Revenue Service on Form 990 if nonprofit revenues exceed $25,000 per year.5 For 
example, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) use IRS data from 1994 to examine voluntary 
contributions to California public schools, supplemented with information on nonprofit mission 
and type obtained from the California Registry of Charitable Trusts. Though they find voluntary 
contributions exceeding $1,000 per pupil in some schools and districts, average district-level 
contributions were measured at $145 per pupil in districts containing at least one school-
supporting nonprofit that filed a Form 990. The authors conclude that “…contributions are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The filing threshold increased to $50,000 in gross revenues in 2010. 
large enough to substantially undermine school finance reform” and that “[e]ven when 
cooperation is substantial…voluntary collective action is a poor substitute for the taxing 
authority of local government” (p. 2159). Brunner and Imazeki (2005) update the California data 
through 2001 and find that—among districts containing at least one school-supporting nonprofit 
that filed a Form 990—average per-pupil net revenues ranged from $188 in high school districts, 
to $274 in unified school districts, and $489 in elementary districts. Averaging across all students 
in California public schools, they find that net revenues per pupil increased 62.5 percent, from 
$24 in 1992 to $39 in 2001. The authors reach a similar conclusion that “…it seems unlikely that 
contributions will ever be the source of wide-scale disruptions in the distribution of revenue 
across communities” (p. 51).  
To estimate philanthropic giving to K-12 education nationally in 2002, Greene (2005) 
employs IRS 990 data reported by the 30 largest K-12 independent foundations as identified by 
the Foundation Center, supplemented with survey data obtained from the largest 100 U.S. public 
school districts. He finds that philanthropic contributions accounted for between $1.5 and $2 
billion in 2002, as compared to overall K-12 spending of $427 billion. Greene concludes that 
“...most current education philanthropy is just dumping buckets of water into the ocean of public 
school spending” (p. 74) and that private contributions to public schools “are simply too small to 
significantly raise the level of resources available to schools” (p. 49).   
A significant body of research suggests that voluntary contributions to public education do 
not constitute a viable alternative to tax revenues and are not sufficiently sizable to overcome 
government failure. Despite this, the Great Recession precipitated large cutbacks in state aid to 
public schools and spurred renewed interest in revenues obtained from nongovernmental sources. 
Though sparse, more recent literature suggests voluntary contributions play a growing role in 
financing public education. Figlio and Kenny (2009) use data on voluntary contributions 
obtained from surveys of Florida elementary and middle school principals in 1999-2000, 2001-
02, and 2003-04 and find that voluntary contributions in these years account for about 5 percent 
of K-12 revenues.6 Another recent analysis by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) 
finds that voluntary contributions to California public schools—as measured by revenues 
reported on IRS Form 990—increased from $70 million in 1989 to $1.3 billion in 2007 (Su 
2012). Unusually large voluntary contributions—such as the $100 million donation by social 
media billionaire Mark Zuckerberg to create the Foundation for Newark’s Future in 2010—
receive substantial attention in the popular press.  
Recent studies in public finance also highlight the growing importance of voluntary 
contributions to public education. Dye and Reschovsky (2008) find that, on average, local school 
districts are able to offset a dollar reduction in state aid with just 37 cents in local property taxes; 
similarly, Alm and Sjoquist (2009) find that Georgia school districts are able to offset every 
dollar reduction in state aid with 40 cents in locally raised revenues. Voluntary contributions 
may help public schools fill in this gap. 
 
Contribution  
 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on voluntary contributions to 
public education. First, the paper updates the literature over the last decade using a panel of data 
on voluntary contributions to public schools from 1995 through 2010, a period that spans 
substantial variation in recessionary trends. In contrast to prior research, the paper employs panel 
(rather than cross-sectional) data with national (rather than statewide) coverage. The data enable 
a comprehensive examination of the levels and distribution of voluntary contributions over time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Figlio and Kenny’s (2009) survey data allow them to observe total voluntary contributions, including those from 
organizations that do not file a Form 990 (i.e., who have gross revenues less than $25,000). 
and across districts and states. Second, the paper disaggregates voluntary contributions by type 
of supporting organization (PTA/PTO, booster, endowment, and school foundation). Third, the 
paper models both the probability that a school district receives revenues from a nonprofit, as 
well as the level of per-pupil voluntary contributions as a function of school district 
characteristics. Fourth, the paper examines whether and how voluntary contributions address 
government failure by offsetting reductions in state aid to public schools.     
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
Our primary dataset contains 16,383 school-supporting nonprofit organizations that file 
annually with the Internal Revenue Service. We identified these organizations in 2012 using the 
2008 Core Public Charity files provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) 
and maintained in the Guidestar nonprofit database, which provides subscription access to data 
on more than 1.8 million tax-exempt U.S. organizations. The Guidestar data include information 
on organization type, mission, and location, as well as Form 990 filing data and expenditure 
reports for nonprofits with annual revenues totaling $25,000 or more. We identified school-
supporting nonprofits in the Guidestar database using keyword searches and National Taxonomy 
of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes, developed by NCCS for classifying nonprofits according to 
mission.7 We excluded from our dataset any organizations that do not provide local support to 
schools or school districts (e.g., education nonprofits that support general education causes, 
private schools, serve multiple districts, or provide education services or resources at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Although the NCCS created the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) coding protocols to provide a 
standardized means of identifying charitable organizations by their purpose, Guidestar assigns different codes and 
Gazley (2011) found that relying solely on select NTEE codes to identify these government-supporting entities was 
insufficient to capture all cases. In the absence of consistent identifiers, a keyword search was performed on the 
approximately 65,000 entities categorized under the NTEE code B for Educational Institutions (this category also 
includes libraries). Separately and in combination, keywords such as “friends”, “education”, “foundation”, “school”, 
“school district”, “booster”, “parent”, “PTO” and “trust” were used to identify the school-supporting nonprofits.  	  
regional, state, or national levels), organizations whose missions do not support school or school 
district operations directly (e.g., organizations whose mission it is to provide college scholarships 
to graduating high school students), organizations without valid locational data, and 
organizations operationally miscategorized in Guidestar. Each organization was coded to identify 
whether it serves a school or school district; its type (PTA, PTO, booster, foundation, 
endowment, or other); and the type of school served by the organization (traditional public, 
magnet, charter, or private). In cases where nonprofit categorizations or addresses were 
ambiguous, we verified information by calling the organizations and/or cross-checking their 
websites by hand.8  
We then linked each identified nonprofit organization to IRS panel data obtained from Form 
990 filings for the years 1995 through 2010. The IRS data include total revenues by year for 
nonprofits with annual revenues exceeding $25,000. Note that we do not observe voluntary 
contributions to school-supporting nonprofits that do not file a Form 990, so our data most likely 
significantly under-report voluntary contributions to public education (Figlio and Kenny 2009).9 
We identify the presence of a school-supporting nonprofit in a given year if it reports revenues 
on its IRS Form 990.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Our tabulation of school-supporting nonprofits differs from the NCCS tabulations. For example, we report 2,116 
foundations in our data, as compared to the NCCS estimate of 9,093 registered foundations in the education 
category. This discrepancy is due to definitional differences. The NCCS figures include education foundations 
spanning 29 categories of support, including management and technical assistance, single organization support, 
fundraising and fund distribution, libraries, parent teacher groups, and scholarships and student financial aid. A good 
example of how the NCCS data tabulations differ from ours is found within the single organization support 
subcategory, which lists over 1,500 organization and is comprised mainly of athletic and music booster clubs. Our 
data tabulates these organizations separately and we do not include them within the count of school foundations. 
Further, the scholarships and student financial aid subcategory includes over 5,000 organizations. We exclude many 
of these organizations from our dataset because they do not provide direct support for school or district operations 
(e.g., their stated missions are to provide college scholarships to graduating high school seniors). 
9 Hansen (2008) notes that beginning in 2006, the U.S. Census Bureau’s survey of school system finances requires 
school districts to report contributions and donations from private sources. Unfortunately, these data are not 
available for the full panel in our study and are not disaggregated by source. 
Next, we used ArcGIS 10 software and school district boundary shapefiles obtained from the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to geocode and match 96.1 percent of the 
nonprofit sample to the correct NCES school district ID using the street address of the school or 
school district office supported by each charitable organization. Note that local education 
nonprofits may provide support at either the school or district levels. We are unable to precisely 
match nonprofits to individual schools using address data because school catchment zone 
shapefiles are not available nationally. As a result, we aggregate school-supporting nonprofit 
data at the school district level – even in cases where nonprofits in our dataset support school-
specific (rather than district-wide) activities. We view this aggregation as acceptable because 
revenues flowing to public schools are fungible within districts, in the sense that voluntary 
contributions made to particular schools may free up resources for other schools within the 
district.  
We then used the NCES school district ID to merge the school-supporting nonprofit dataset 
to national panel data on unified school districts obtained from the NCES Common Core of Data 
(CCD), which are available from 1999 through 2010. The CCD panel data include total 
enrollment, expenditures per student, the percent of students enrolled in free and reduced-price 
meal programs (a measure of student poverty), the percent of English Learner students, and 
student-teacher ratios for each unified school district. We also constrain our analysis to school-
supporting nonprofits that serve unified public school districts, due to difficulties in assigning 
nonprofits to districts in cases where district boundaries overlap (for example, in the case of 
overlapping elementary and high school districts) and due to differences in the funding of non-
unified public school districts.  
Finally, we merge our dataset with NCES panel data obtained from the Local Education 
Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F-33) Data.10 The F-33 data report total district 
revenues by funding source. We use these data to calculate state revenues per pupil in each year 
from 1999 through 2010, and to calculate the change in state revenues per pupil from the prior 
year. We use these variables to answer our third research question: To what extent do voluntary 
contributions offset reductions in state aid to public schools?  
Due to these additional data requirements, our final analysis sample includes a total of 13,058 
unique school-supporting nonprofits. We use the Consumer Price Index to transform all variables 
measured in dollars (nonprofit revenues, per-pupil expenditures, and state revenues per pupil) to 
inflation-adjusted 2010 dollars. To account for outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 1% 
extreme values of the distribution. 
     
4. THE RISE OF SCHOOL-SUPPORTING NONPROFITS 
We first examine changes in voluntary contributions to public schools from 1995 through 2010 
using our primary dataset of 16,383 school-supporting nonprofits that file annually with the IRS. 
Table 1 displays school-supporting nonprofits by organization type. PTAs and PTOs constitute 
the majority—70.2 percent—of nonprofits in our dataset. Booster clubs and local school 
foundations constitute an additional 15.1 and 12.9 percent, while school endowments and other 
organizations comprise a very small share (less than two percent).   
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Though F-33 school finance data are available for the entire panel from 1995-2010, we only merge in school 
finance data for the years in which we also observe school district demographic data obtained from the NCES 
Common Core of Data (1999 through 2010). 
Table 2 partitions the school-supporting nonprofits in our dataset by the school type served. The 
vast majority of charities in our dataset—93.8 percent—support traditional public schools or 
districts; an additional 2.6 percent of charities support public magnet schools, while 1.3 percent 
support public charter schools.11  
  
[Table 2 here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the spatial distribution of school-supporting nonprofits in our dataset. 
School-supporting nonprofits in our sample have broad representation across the U.S., and their 
geographic distribution is denser in areas with higher population density.    
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 2 illustrates tremendous growth in the number of school-supporting nonprofit IRS 990 
filings from 1995 through 2010, overall and by organization type. Table 3 reports the 
corresponding percent increases in filings during the same time period, partitioned by 
organization type. Overall, the number of school-supporting nonprofits increased 230 percent, 
from 3,475 organizations in 1995 to 11,453 organizations in 2010. Further, over the same time 
period, the number of 990 filings increased by at least 100 percent, and the growth was more 
than 300 percent for PTOs, school foundations, and booster club filings.   
 
[Figure 2 here] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Table 2 reports that 2.3 percent of charities in our dataset support private schools. We exclude these charities from 
our analysis sample because they do not support public schools or districts. 
 [Table 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the growth in total (gross) revenues reported by school-supporting 
nonprofits filing an IRS Form 990 from 1995 through 2010, overall and by organization type. 
Table 4 reports the corresponding percent increases in revenues during the same time period. 
Overall, school-supporting nonprofit revenues increased 347.7 percent—from about $197 
million in 1995 to $880 million in 2010—and increased at a faster rate than nonprofit filings. 
Over the same time period, total revenues increased by at least 200 percent among PTOs, PTAs, 
school foundations, and boosters. PTOs and school foundations saw tremendous increases in 
total revenues, increasing over the time period by 527 and 485 percent, respectively.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Finally, Table 5 reports growth in the representation of IRS-filing, school-supporting 
nonprofits in public school districts from 1995 through 2010. The percent of public school 
districts where at least one of these organizations operated increased from just 12 percent in 1995 
to 29 percent in 2010. Over the same time period, the percent of school districts with a PTA or 
PTO increased from 9 to 20; the percent of school districts with a foundation increased from 2.2 
to 8.5; and the percent of school districts with a booster club increased from 3.3 to 10.1. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Research on school-supporting nonprofit 990 filings has not been updated since Brunner and 
Imazeki (2005), a study that relied on tax filing data available through 2001. The time trends 
reported in figures 2 and 3 indicate that the majority of growth in 990 filings and revenues has 
occurred since 2001, in the latter portion of the panel. The figure also reflects a peak in nonprofit 
filings and revenue levels in 2008 at the start of the Great Recession.  This peak provides 
suggestive evidence that school-supporting nonprofits play more important roles during 
economic recessions, a hypothesis we test empirically in Section 6 by examining how nonprofit 
revenues vary with changes in state aid and per-pupil expenditures. Note, however, that the peak 
in observed in 2009 and 2010 may be artificial and temporary; the subsequent drop in tax filings 
and revenues observed in 2009 and 2010 should be interpreted with care, for two reasons. First, 
organizations that delayed filing a Form 990 in 2009 or 2010 may not appear in our dataset for 
those years. Second, the IRS increased the Form 990 filing threshold to $50,000 in gross 
revenues in 2010; as a result, nonprofit organizations with revenues falling between the 2009 
threshold of $25,000 and the 2010 threshold of $50,000 may not have filed a Form 990 in 2010. 
We address this sample truncation issue by excluding observations from 2010 in our subsequent 
empirical analyses. 
 
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF NONPROFIT CONTRIBUTIONS  
In this section, we examine the distributional consequences of voluntary contributions to 
public schools. The presence of school-supporting nonprofits and the level of voluntary 
contributions to public schools are not uniform. The uneven distribution of charitable resources 
enables us to examine demand heterogeneity across school districts and associated equity 
implications, including whether the distribution of nonprofit revenues results in funding 
inequalities that are sufficiently large to undermine school finance equalization. To answer these 
questions, we employ panel data on school-supporting nonprofits linked to a complete panel of 
unified school district data for the years 1999 through 2009, in which we observe school district 
data obtained from the NCES Common Core of Data. Excluding observations from 2010 in our 
sample due to changes in 501(c)(3) IRS filing requirements, our final analysis sample includes 
13,058 unique school-supporting nonprofits that meet the criteria for sample inclusion described 
in Section 3.   
We first model the probability that a unified school district receives revenues from a school-
supporting 501(c)(3) charity as a function of time-varying school district characteristics: the 
change in state revenues per pupil from the prior year, the log of total enrollment, the log of 
expenditures per student, the percent of students enrolled in free and reduced-price meal 
programs, the percent of English Learners, and student-teacher ratios. We begin with the 
following reduced-form model: 
 𝑌!" = 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝜂! + 𝜀!"          (1) 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether district d receives any 
revenues from a school-supporting 501(c)(3) charity in year t (i.e., whether any organization files 
an IRS Form 990 in the district in a given year), X is a set of time-varying district characteristics, 𝜂 denotes year fixed effects and captures systematic differences in IRS filings over time, and ε 
denotes the random error term. The coefficient β is the average effect of that district 
characteristic on the probability of the district having at least one school-supporting nonprofit in 
a given year. We estimate a linear probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity resulting from the application of OLS 
techniques to limited dependent variables. The model coefficients β are descriptive and not 
causal, because unobserved district characteristics are likely to be correlated with both the 
observed district characteristics (X) and with whether any organization files an IRS Form 990 in 
the district (Y). Thus, omitting these variables is likely to bias estimates of the effects of district 
characteristics on our dependent variable of interest. 
A major benefit of using panel data for our analysis is that it enables us to reduce bias in our 
estimated coefficients by including a rich set of fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
observed and unobserved variation nested within units. Our data have broad national coverage 
and span eleven years, so we are able to modify equation (1) to include additional fixed effects: 
   𝑌!" = 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝛾! + 𝜂! + 𝜀!"          (2) 
In equation (2), γ denotes a set of fixed effects, which may be specified at either the state level s 
or at the school district level d. The fixed effects model reduces bias associated with time-
invariant observed and unobserved differences in states (districts) that may be correlated with 
both the time-varying district characteristics and our dependent variable. While this model 
reduces bias due to systematic differences in district characteristics across states (and in district 
characteristics over time), the estimated β coefficients may still be biased due to time-varying 
unobservables at the district level. The inclusion of school district fixed effects in equation (2) 
requires that the β coefficients are estimated using within-district variation in district 
characteristics, and net of time trends. Such a parameterization reduces bias but is likely to yield 
relatively imprecise estimates of β. Alternatively, a less restrictive parameterization with fixed 
effects at the state level will yield β estimates that are more precise but relatively biased.  
Notably, linear probability models are prone to problems arising from unbounded predicted 
values; as we observe in our models, estimated coefficients may take on values that are greater 
than one and less than negative one. However, we prefer the OLS specification to the standard 
logit or probit specification because it is not prone to the incidental parameters problem 
encountered when using maximum likelihood techniques in combination with fixed effects. In 
untabulated results, we run probit specifications without fixed effects to test the robustness of our 
reduced-form estimates to non-linear transformations.  
Table 6 reports results from our linear probability regressions modeling whether a unified 
school district receives revenues from a school-supporting 501(c)(3) charity. Model I displays 
the reduced-form estimates, Model II displays results including state fixed effects, and Model III 
displays results including school district (rather than state) fixed effects.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Coefficients on the year fixed effects confirm the descriptive trends in Table 5. The probability 
that a school district receives revenues from any school-supporting nonprofit increases 
monotonically from 1999 through 2008, before dropping off slightly in 2009.12 Depending on the 
model specification, the probability is between 0.09 and 0.16 higher in 2008 as compared to the 
1999 baseline year.  
The probability that any school-supporting nonprofit files an IRS Form 990 in a district is 
significantly higher in districts with higher per-pupil expenditures and higher enrollments. The 
reduced-form coefficients on these variables are underestimated relative to the state fixed effects 
model, but overestimated relative to the district fixed effects model. These relationships imply 
that within states, the probability of receiving revenues from a school-supporting nonprofit is 
more variable than across states. Unsurprisingly, the probability is less variable within districts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 As we discuss in Section 4, part of the decline in 2009 may be due to delays in IRS tax filings. 
over time, as we observe in the more restrictive district fixed effects model; however, estimated 
coefficients remain positive and statistically significant. Coefficients on other school district 
characteristics are less consistent across model specifications. For example, higher pupil-teacher 
ratios are associated with significantly lower probabilities of receiving revenues from a school-
supporting nonprofit, but only in the state fixed effects model. The percent of English Learners 
in the district is associated with higher marginal probabilities of receiving revenues from a 
school-supporting nonprofit, but the effect is statistically significant in the district fixed effects 
model only. Finally, the percent of students in poverty (as measured by enrollment in free- and 
reduced-price meal programs) is associated with significantly lower probabilities of receiving 
school-supporting nonprofit revenues in the reduced-form and state fixed effect models, but the 
effect is not statistically significant in the district fixed effects model. Within-district variation in 
poverty may not be sufficiently large over time to identify the effect precisely. Taken together, 
the results generally indicate that relatively large districts with higher spending per pupil have 
higher probabilities of receiving revenues from a school-supporting nonprofit, while the 
probability is lower among districts serving higher proportions of students in poverty.  
Table 7 reports results from additional regressions that model separately the probabilities that 
school districts receive revenues from any PTA/PTO, booster club, or school foundation. For 
each model, we report results from the reduced-form, state fixed effect, and district fixed effect 
specifications. The time trends observed closely match those reported in Table 6. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The probability that a school district receives revenues from a PTA/PTO, booster club, or school 
foundation is significantly higher in districts with higher student enrollments, regardless of the 
model specification. Coefficients on other time-varying district characteristics are more variable 
across models. For example, per-pupil spending positively and significantly predicts whether a 
district receives revenues from a PTA/PTO or from a school foundation, though the results are 
insignificant in the reduced-form specification of the school foundation model. Higher pupil-
teacher ratios are also associated with significantly lower probabilities of a district receiving 
revenues from a PTA/PTO or booster club in the state fixed effects specifications, indicating that 
within states, PTA/PTO and booster club nonprofits disproportionately serve districts with lower 
average class sizes. There is an interesting relationship between the percent of English Learners 
in a district and the probability of receiving revenues from a booster club or a school foundation. 
The percent of English Learners positively and significantly predicts these probabilities in the 
reduced form models but not in the state fixed effect models, indicating that cross-state 
differences in the distribution of English Learners largely explain the differences observed in the 
reduced form models. However, the percent of English Learners also positively and significantly 
predicts the probability of a district receiving booster club revenues in the district fixed effects 
regression. The findings suggest that within districts, an increase in the percent of English 
Learner students over time is associated with higher probabilities of districts receiving any 
revenue from a booster club. Finally, we find that the percent of students in poverty is associated 
with significantly lower probabilities of receiving school-supporting nonprofit revenues from a 
PTA/PTO, booster club, or school foundation in the reduced-form and state fixed effect models, 
but the effect is not statistically significant in the district fixed effects model. Again, it may be 
the case that within-district variation in poverty may not be sufficiently large over time to 
identify the effect precisely. 
We next turn to modeling the level of per-pupil voluntary contributions at the district level as 
a function of school district characteristics. We adapt the reduced-form and fixed effects 
specifications in equations (1) and (2), changing the dependent variable Y from a dichotomous 
outcome to a continuously defined measure of nonprofit revenues per pupil, calculated using 
total revenues across all nonprofits in the school district and dividing by the total number of 
enrolled students. We estimate our models using OLS. Because our dependent variable is no 
longer dichotomous, we no longer encounter problems in interpreting unbounded predicted 
coefficients; in addition, heterskedasticity is of less concern with a continuously defined 
dependent variable (though we continue to use robust standard errors in our models). We run our 
district-level models of per-pupil revenue conditional on the sample of districts that received 
revenues from a school-supporting organization (i.e., the sample of districts for which the 
dependent variable was equal to one in our first set of regressions in Table 6). This specification 
raises two issues. First, our data are left-censored because we do not observe revenues from 
school-supporting nonprofits that do not file with the IRS, and so (1) our analysis sample is 
likely to be truncated and (2) we are likely to under-estimate total per-pupil nonprofit revenues 
(Figlio and Kenny 2009). However, we are unable to employ a Tobit specification to account for 
this censoring because the likelihood estimator for fixed effects is biased and inconsistent. 
Second, the selection of school districts into our sample is non-random and will lead to biased 
coefficient estimates. However, we are unable to employ the results from our first set of 
regressions in Table 6 in a standard Heckman selection model because we do not observe 
variables in our dataset that form a valid exclusion restriction. Therefore, coefficient estimates 
should be interpreted with caution as descriptive rather than causal. 
Table 8 reports our results modeling the level of per-pupil voluntary contributions (as 
measured by the average of district school-supporting nonprofit revenues) using the same 
specifications and school district characteristics as in the models reported in tables 6 and 7. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Coefficients on the year fixed effects again confirm the time trends in Table 5. Per-pupil 
voluntary contributions increase monotonically in each year from 1999 through 2008 (and 
slightly decline in 2009). Notably, the time trends are the most sizable and statistically 
significant in the district fixed effects regression, suggesting that time trends within districts 
explain large differences in voluntary contributions. The district fixed effect regression suggests 
that within districts, average per-pupil voluntary contributions increased by nearly $30 from 
1999 through 2009.  
Our results also provide support for Brunner and Sontelie’s (2003) model of partial 
cooperation, which posits that the marginal price of voluntary contributions increases with the 
number of students enrolled in the district. Using California data, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) 
find a negative cross-sectional relationship between per-pupil donations and enrollment, and 
Brunner and Imazeki (2005) confirm this relationship using an updated panel dataset but without 
additional controls. In our dataset, which includes national panel data from 1999 through 2009, 
we find a sizable and statistically significant negative relationship between per-pupil voluntary 
contributions—as measured by the revenues reported by nonprofits filing IRS Form 990—and 
the log of district enrollment in both our reduced-form and state fixed effects models. The effect 
is statistically insignificant in the district fixed effects specification, suggesting that enrollment 
changes over time within districts and net of secular trends do not significantly predict the level 
of per-pupil voluntary contributions.   
In our model of per-pupil voluntary contributions, coefficients on the remaining time-varying 
district characteristics shed additional light on the distributional consequences of nonprofit 
contributions. First, we find no evidence in any of our model specifications that per-pupil 
voluntary contributions vary significantly with the percent of English Learners in a school 
district. Second, we find that pupil-teacher ratios negatively and significantly predict voluntary 
contributions in our state fixed effects model, but positively and significantly predict voluntary 
contributions in our district fixed effects model. These results suggest that within states, districts 
with relatively high class sizes receive lower voluntary contributions on a per-pupil basis. 
However, within districts, class size increases over time are associated with higher average per-
pupil voluntary contributions. Third, we find that the percent of students in poverty is associated 
with significantly lower voluntary contributions per pupil across each of our model 
specifications. We discuss the coefficients on our financial variables of interest—state revenues 
per pupil and per pupil expenditures—in Section 6. 
As final robustness check, we re-run our reduced-form, state fixed effects, and district fixed 
effects regressions using a first-differences model, where the dependent variable is defined as the 
change in per-pupil voluntary contributions from the prior year. Table 8 reports the results. 
Results from the first-differences model are similar to those observed in the model of per-pupil 
voluntary contributions. Coefficients on both time trend and district time-varying coefficients 
generally hold the same sign, though the statistical significance and magnitude of the effect sizes 
are different due to changes in the scale and variability of the dependent variable.   
Taken together, results reported in tables 6, 7, and 8 indicate substantial growth in both the 
presence of school-supporting nonprofits and in the level of per-pupil voluntary contributions 
from 1999 through 2009, overall and by organization type. We also find that school districts with 
relatively high student enrollments and per-pupil expenditures have higher probabilities of being 
served by at least one school-supporting nonprofit, but that the level of per-pupil voluntary 
contributions declines with student enrollment. Higher-poverty school districts are less likely to 
be served by a school-supporting nonprofit; further, among school districts with at least one 
school-supporting nonprofit, higher-poverty school districts receive significantly lower voluntary 
contributions on a per-pupil basis.  
 
6. DO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS REPLACE REDUCTIONS IN STATE AID?  
 
In this section, we examine whether voluntary contributions offset reductions in state aid to 
public schools. We address this research question by re-visiting the models of per-pupil 
voluntary contributions reported in Table 8, and focus our attention on interpreting the 
coefficients on school district fiscal measures. The fiscal measures in both models capture some 
aspects of fiscal stress, enabling us to test empirically the responsiveness of voluntary 
contributions to recession.  
The first set of regressions models per-pupil voluntary contributions as a function of time-
varying district characteristics and year fixed effects. The time-varying district characteristics 
include two fiscal variables—state revenues per pupil and the log of per-pupil expenditures—
which form our policy variables of interest. We find no evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between per-pupil expenditures and per-pupil voluntary contributions. However, we 
find that higher state revenues per pupil are associated with lower per-pupil voluntary 
contributions. This relationship—which holds across the reduced-form, state fixed effects, and 
district fixed effects specifications—implies that voluntary contributions are higher when school 
districts face recessionary reductions in state aid. The persistence of this relationship in the 
district fixed effects specification indicates that within-district reductions in state aid per pupil 
over time are associated with higher levels of per-pupil voluntary contributions. However, the 
magnitude of the effect is not economically meaningful: a $100 increase in state revenues per 
pupil is associated with reductions in per-pupil voluntary contributions ranging from 20 to 32 
cents. Although the relationship we estimate is descriptive and not causal, it is difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which additional bias-reduction techniques---namely, via a two-stage 
Heckman selection model or through the inclusion of additional time-varying district 
characteristics—would change the coefficients so substantially as to render them economically 
meaningful. Even large changes in the parameterization of our models—from a reduced-form 
specification to a district fixed effects specification—yield changes in coefficient estimates that 
amount to pennies on the dollar.   
As a robustness check, we run a second set of regressions in which we define the dependent 
variable as the change in per-pupil voluntary contributions from the prior year. We use the same 
set of control variables as in the first set of regressions, but we difference our two fiscal variables 
so they measure (1) changes in state revenues per pupil from the prior year, and (2) changes in 
per-pupil expenditures from the prior year. In these models, we find no evidence of a statistically 
significant relationship between the differenced dependent variable and the differenced fiscal 
variables. In summary, we find a negative but economically meaningless relationship between 
state aid per pupil and per-pupil voluntary contributions, a finding which implies that voluntary 
contributions do not offset reductions in state aid and do not constitute an efficient or stable 
substitute for the financing of K-12 public education.  
 
7. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS: STILL BUCKETS INTO THE SEA? 
We now revisit the question of whether the rise in voluntary contributions is sufficiently 
substantial to change the distribution of funding across school districts and to undo school 
finance equalization. We first aggregate total school-supporting nonprofit revenues across all 
unified public school districts in the U.S. and divide this figure by total student enrollment in 
these districts. At the beginning of our panel in 1995, per-pupil voluntary contributions in the 
U.S. were $3.67; by 2010, the amount increased to $20.31. Conditioning on only those unified 
school districts with at least one school-supporting nonprofit, we find average per-pupil 
voluntary contributions of $8.02 in 1995, a figure that grew to $28.38 in 2010.13 Despite this 
tremendous growth, voluntary contributions to public schools—as measured by IRS Form 990 
filings—remain a small fraction of total per pupil dollars spent on public education; in 2010, 
U.S. K-12 public schools spent an average of $10,615 per student (Dixon 2012). Moreover, 
cross-district variation in voluntary contributions is unlikely to undermine school finance 
equalization. As one example, the Serrano v. Priest decision in California places statutory limits 
on differences in per-pupil expenditures across districts, but the limit—set at about $300—is far 
higher than average levels of per-pupil voluntary contributions.  
Unfortunately, the 2010 changes in IRS Form 990 filing requirements will complicate future 
attempts to examine changes in voluntary contributions to public schools using a consistent 
source of data. However, relatively new sources of data on voluntary contributions—such as the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s survey of school system finances that began in 2006—may reveal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 We report all dollar figures using inflation-adjusted 2010 dollars. 
significantly higher levels of voluntary contributions than are observed when relying on IRS 
Form 990 data.14  
Finally, our low average levels of per-pupil voluntary contributions belie the influential 
effect of school-supporting nonprofit activity within districts, where voluntary contributions may 
have sizable effects on the particular students or programs that benefit disproportionately from 
such funding.15 Recent anecdotal evidence suggests school districts are concerned increasingly 
with the uneven distribution of nonprofit revenues across schools. For example, California’s 
Santa Monica – Malibu, Manhattan Beach, and Palo Alto school districts recently adopted 
policies to pool voluntary contributions at the district level for redistribution across schools (The 
Center for Investigative Reporting 2012).    
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, considerable scholarly and practitioner discussion has focused on the role of 
coproductive and philanthropic activity in public service provision. Our trend data make it clear 
that communities depend increasingly on philanthropic revenue to support public education. By 
2010, school foundations and booster clubs alone have grown to represent more than one-quarter 
of all school-supporting nonprofits and to raise more than half of the $880 million in 2010 
revenue that these charities contributed to public education.  Our findings also generally indicate 
that relatively large districts with higher spending per pupil have higher probabilities of receiving 
revenues from a school-supporting nonprofit, but that the level of per-pupil voluntary 
contributions declines with student enrollment. Higher-poverty school districts are less likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Figlio and Kenny (2009) discuss the limitations of IRS Form 990 data in producing accurate estimates of 
voluntary contributions to public schools. 
15 Low average levels of per-pupil funding also may belie the influential effect of school-supporting nonprofit 
activity across districts that may only be observed in a less parametric context (e.g., in quintile regressions). We 
leave this possibility to future research.  
be served by a school-supporting nonprofit; further, among school districts with at least one 
school-supporting nonprofit, higher-poverty school districts receive significantly lower voluntary 
contributions on a per-pupil basis. These associations between school philanthropy and district 
wealth and size prevail after accounting for district and state fixed effects, although the effect 
sizes vary.  
Finally, impressive recent growth in the number and financial size of these school supporting 
charities since 1995 has not offset reductions in state aid. Moreover, we do not find sufficient 
evidence to conclude that voluntary contributions change the distribution of funding across 
school districts and undo school finance equalization. 
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Table 1. School-Supporting Nonprofits by Organization Type 
Type	   Number	   Percent	  
Boosters	   2,480	   15.1%	  
Foundations	   2,116	   12.9%	  
Endowments	   44	   0.3%	  
PTA	   8,121	   49.6%	  
PTO	   3,373	   20.6%	  
Other	   249	   1.5%	  
Total	   16,383	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100.0%	  
 
Table 2. School-Supporting Nonprofits by School Type 
Type	   Number	   Percent	  
Public	   15,364	   93.8%	  
Private	   377	   2.3%	  
Public	  magnet	   426	   2.6%	  
Public	  charter	   207	   1.3%	  
Unknown	   9	   0.1%	  
Total	   16,383	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100.0%	  
 
  
Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of School-Supporting Nonprofits 
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Figure 2. Time Series of School-Supporting Nonprofits by Organization Typea 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
FOUNDATION 263 306 361 399 493 536 620 695 759 837 915 999 1,107 1,199 950 1,079
BOOSTER 431 469 530 571 684 768 853 976 1,085 1,225 1,355 1,489 1,711 1,923 1,610 1,761
PTO 528 643 724 818 962 1,094 1,251 1,426 1,645 1,890 2,069 2,282 2,602 2,921 2,411 2,601
PTA 2,236 2,515 2,851 3,052 3,460 3,578 3,861 4,173 4,522 4,924 5,251 5,627 6,270 6,982 5,497 5,963
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
N
um
be
r o
f O
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 a The dropoff in number of filing organizations in 2009 and 2010 is most likely due to delays in filing 990 Forms. 
  
Figure 3. Time Series of School-Supporting Nonprofit Revenues by Organization Type 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PTO $21,966,242 $27,892,550 $32,288,070 $39,064,067 $50,531,717 $57,008,451 $64,774,292 $73,431,085 $89,366,021 $102,212,69 $114,708,75 $128,301,10 $150,405,59 $159,129,82 $130,659,33 $137,713,63
BOOSTER $31,078,895 $34,216,557 $41,552,313 $42,482,310 $54,082,724 $61,365,750 $67,541,837 $77,084,020 $86,156,556 $98,533,156 $112,763,54 $129,978,89 $148,326,99 $165,922,94 $137,328,04 $148,900,39
PTA $87,578,215 $103,896,62 $121,173,17 $125,534,82 $146,733,73 $161,154,23 $177,517,57 $199,749,69 $216,128,39 $232,311,47 $251,146,49 $277,831,70 $299,233,51 $318,769,67 $267,651,43 $287,860,29
FOUNDATION $50,766,059 $55,327,204 $75,052,935 $89,303,657 $115,804,66 $122,472,87 $139,965,60 $151,423,91 $177,259,31 $205,407,79 $220,197,18 $265,525,90 $348,685,57 $341,839,89 $287,372,06 $296,959,23
$0
$200,000,000
$400,000,000
$600,000,000
$800,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,200,000,000
R
ev
en
ue
Revenue by Organization Type and Year
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Growth in School-Supporting Nonprofits, 1995 - 2010 
 
Organizations, 1995 Organizations, 2010
Percent increase in 
organizations, 1995-2010
PTOs 528 2,601 392.6%
LEFs 263 1,079 310.3%
Boosters 431 1,761 308.6%
Other 6 24 300.0%
PTAs 2,236 5,963 166.7%
Endowments 11 25 127.3%
Total 3,475 11,453 229.6% 	  
	  
 
Table 4. Growth in School-Supporting Nonprofit Revenues, 1995-2010 
 
Revenue, 1995 Revenue, 2010
Percent increase in 
revenue, 1995-2010
PTOs $21,966,242 $137,713,636 526.9%
LEFs $50,766,059 $296,959,231 485.0%
Boosters $31,078,895 $148,900,391 379.1%
PTAs $87,578,215 $287,860,297 228.7%
Other $2,763,032 $5,545,986 100.7%
Endowments $2,452,346 $3,146,526 28.3%
Total $196,604,789 $880,126,067 347.7% 	  
	  
 
  
Table 5. Growth in School-Supporting Nonprofit Representation, 1995-2010 
 
Proportion of School Districts with a School-Supporting Nonprofit, by Organization 
Type and Year 
Year Any PTA/PTO Foundation Booster Club Endowment 
1995 0.1207 0.0899 0.0218 0.0326 0.0010 
1996 0.1317 0.0997 0.0253 0.0353 0.0010 
1997 0.1452 0.1094 0.0295 0.0391 0.0012 
1998 0.1556 0.1150 0.0330 0.0424 0.0012 
1999 0.1729 0.1253 0.0400 0.0488 0.0014 
2000 0.1816 0.1314 0.0437 0.0545 0.0014 
2001 0.1946 0.1385 0.0506 0.0584 0.0017 
2002 0.2112 0.1493 0.0564 0.0653 0.0016 
2003 0.2256 0.1604 0.0614 0.0714 0.0019 
2004 0.2397 0.1703 0.0668 0.0780 0.0020 
2005 0.2530 0.1781 0.0726 0.0848 0.0020 
2006 0.2692 0.1879 0.0785 0.0909 0.0022 
2007 0.2920 0.2034 0.0868 0.1004 0.0023 
2008 0.3109 0.2161 0.0938 0.1090 0.0024 
2009 0.2718 0.1930 0.0754 0.0943 0.0020 
2010 0.2885 0.2007 0.0849 0.1014 0.0023 
 
  
Table 6. The Distribution of School-Supporting Nonprofits 
 
DV: Any organization 
                                                                                                    I II III 
                                                                                                     Reduced Form State FE District FE 
Change in state revenue -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
                                                                                                     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Per pupil expenditures (ln) 0.109** 0.158*** 0.033** 
                                                                                                     (0.037) (0.032) (0.011) 
Percent English Learners 0.219 0.046 0.081* 
                                                                                                     (0.175) (0.163) (0.038) 
Enrollment (ln) 0.192*** 0.213*** 0.150*** 
                                                                                                     (0.009) (0.006) (0.027) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.004 -0.015*** 0.002 
                                                                                                     (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Percent free/reduced lunch -0.608*** -0.658*** -0.031 
                                                                                                     (0.075) (0.096) (0.029) 
2000 0.001 0.002 0.011* 
                                                                                                     (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) 
2001 -0.001 0.000 0.022*** 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.005) 
2002 0.027 0.015 0.042*** 
                                                                                                     (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) 
2003 0.043* 0.029* 0.061*** 
                                                                                                     (0.019) (0.013) (0.007) 
2004 0.059** 0.048*** 0.079*** 
                                                                                                     (0.022) (0.014) (0.007) 
2005 0.071** 0.058*** 0.092*** 
                                                                                                     (0.024) (0.015) (0.008) 
2006 0.085** 0.065*** 0.112*** 
                                                                                                     (0.025) (0.017) (0.008) 
2007 0.095** 0.083*** 0.140*** 
                                                                                                     (0.033) (0.020) (0.009) 
2008 0.102** 0.094*** 0.163*** 
                                                                                                     (0.037) (0.021) (0.010) 
2009 0.072* 0.049* 0.113*** 
                                                                                                     (0.034) (0.021) (0.010) 
Constant                                                                                             -2.025*** -2.401*** -1.226*** 
                                                                                                     (0.377) (0.326) (0.247) 
Observations                                                                                         43,400 43,400 43,400 
R^2                                                                                                  0.388 0.419 0.082 
adj. R^2                                                                                             0.388 0.418 0.081 
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
 
Table 7. The Distribution of School-Supporting Nonprofits, by Organization Type 
 
DV: Any PTA/PTO DV: Any Booster DV: Any School Foundation 
                                                                                                     IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
                                                                                                     
Reduced 
Form State FE 
District 
FE 
Reduced 
Form State FE 
District 
FE 
Reduced 
Form State FE 
District 
FE 
Change in state revenue -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
                                                                                                     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Per pupil expenditures (ln) 0.133*** 0.162*** 0.020* -0.058 0.024 -0.004 -0.025 0.091*** 0.019** 
                                                                                                     (0.035) (0.036) (0.009) (0.033) (0.020) (0.007) (0.034) (0.015) (0.007) 
Percent English Learners 0.339 0.151 0.048 0.163* 0.047 0.052* 0.176* 0.032 0.036 
                                                                                                     (0.186) (0.174) (0.032) (0.066) (0.064) (0.026) (0.079) (0.065) (0.024) 
Enrollment (ln) 0.177*** 0.194*** 0.146*** 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.168*** 0.068*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 
                                                                                                     (0.012) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.006) (0.005) (0.026) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.001 -0.017*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.016*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.000 
                                                                                                     (0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Percent free/reduced 
lunch -0.603*** -0.685*** -0.022 -0.192*** -0.280*** 0.001 -0.123** -0.158*** -0.003 
                                                                                                     (0.090) (0.115) (0.024) (0.038) (0.037) (0.020) (0.035) (0.036) (0.017) 
2000 -0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.010** 0.004 0.002 0.010** 
                                                                                                     (0.015) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
2001 -0.021 -0.016 0.010* 0.022* 0.007 0.014*** 0.015* 0.004 0.018*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
2002 0.000 -0.009 0.025*** 0.036** 0.015 0.025*** 0.022** 0.005 0.025*** 
                                                                                                     (0.021) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
2003 0.010 0.004 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.025* 0.036*** 0.028** 0.007 0.032*** 
                                                                                                     (0.022) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) 
2004 0.023 0.022 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.013* 0.039*** 
                                                                                                     (0.025) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
2005 0.025 0.024 0.065*** 0.088*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.019* 0.046*** 
                                                                                                     (0.026) (0.017) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
2006 0.028 0.021 0.077*** 0.093*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.019* 0.053*** 
                                                                                                     (0.030) (0.019) (0.007) (0.018) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
2007 0.023 0.030 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.066*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.022* 0.061*** 
                                                                                                     (0.037) (0.023) (0.008) (0.022) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) 
2008 0.027 0.035 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.024* 0.068*** 
                                                                                                     (0.041) (0.025) (0.008) (0.024) (0.016) (0.007) (0.019) (0.010) (0.006) 
2009 0.016 0.012 0.085*** 0.107*** 0.058** 0.075*** 0.055** -0.002 0.045*** 
                                                                                                     (0.039) (0.025) (0.009) (0.026) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019) (0.010) (0.007) 
Constant                                                                                             -2.149*** -2.320*** -1.116*** -0.103 -0.774*** -1.218*** -0.196 -1.220*** -0.794*** 
                                                                                                     (0.365) (0.389) (0.233) (0.290) (0.191) (0.216) (0.308) (0.128) (0.213) 
Observations                                                                                         43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 43,400 
R^2                                                                                                  0.379 0.417 0.062 0.164 0.212 0.050 0.088 0.133 0.035 
adj. R^2                                                                                             0.378 0.416 0.062 0.163 0.211 0.050 0.087 0.132 0.034 
 
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 8. The Distribution of School-Supporting Nonprofit Revenue 
 
DV: Per-pupil voluntary contributions 
DV: Difference in per-pupil voluntary 
contributions 
                                                                                                    I II III IV V VI 
                                                                                                     
Reduced 
Form State FE District FE 
Reduced 
Form State FE District FE 
State revenues per 
pupil (in $100) -0.319*** -0.267** -0.202* - - - 
                                                                                                     (0.080) (0.088) (0.095) - - - 
Difference in state 
revenues per pupil - - - 0.014 0.018 0.039 
 
- - - (0.047) (0.048) (0.055) 
Per pupil expenditures 
(ln) 0.001 0.002 0.001 - - - 
                                                                                                     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - - - 
Difference in per 
pupil expenditures - - - -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
- - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent English 
Learners 64.594 37.046 3.673 4.617 6.288 21.970* 
                                                                                                     (33.663) (47.113) (15.192) (4.306) (5.377) (10.287) 
Enrollment (ln) -9.960*** -10.158** -61.708 -0.185 -0.290 -19.534 
                                                                                                     (2.498) (3.274) (42.552) (0.427) (0.518) (13.605) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.793 -1.761* 0.721* -0.082 -0.030 0.432 
                                                                                                     (0.888) (0.850) (0.353) (0.081) (0.239) (0.393) 
Percent free/reduced 
lunch -23.452 -39.434** -37.212*** -3.003* -3.265** -8.608 
                                                                                                     (13.201) (14.624) (11.037) (1.462) (1.100) (12.910) 
2000 1.206 0.880 3.419*** -0.538 -0.540 0.048 
                                                                                                     (1.180) (1.473) (0.927) (0.943) (0.972) (1.030) 
2001 1.412 0.147 5.791*** -0.736 -0.668 0.439 
 
(1.434) (1.985) (1.354) (1.004) (1.025) (1.079) 
2002 3.182 1.394 9.808*** -0.927 -0.911 0.268 
                                                                                                     (2.294) (2.325) (1.961) (1.199) (1.223) (1.350) 
2003 3.730 1.889 12.371*** -0.270 -0.437 0.905 
                                                                                                     (2.004) (2.242) (2.417) (0.922) (0.864) (1.200) 
2004 5.825* 2.659 15.279*** -0.366 -0.830 1.255 
                                                                                                     (2.496) (2.335) (2.771) (0.914) (0.971) (1.538) 
2005 8.546** 3.485 18.859*** 0.335 -0.226 2.083 
                                                                                                     (2.463) (2.689) (3.164) (0.940) (0.973) (1.657) 
2006 11.871*** 6.664 23.756*** 0.816 0.443 2.956 
                                                                                                     (3.069) (3.498) (3.681) (0.831) (0.888) (1.904) 
2007 13.101** 8.646* 28.442*** 2.047 2.049 4.363 
                                                                                                     (3.796) (3.869) (4.763) (1.083) (1.069) (2.486) 
2008 17.528** 11.528 29.604*** -1.014 -0.904 1.636 
                                                                                                     (6.462) (7.322) (4.840) (1.370) (1.373) (2.352) 
2009 16.386* 8.787 27.849*** -5.698*** -5.747*** -3.064 
                                                                                                     (6.586) (7.706) (4.594) (1.200) (1.235) (2.240) 
Constant                                                                                             105.027** 144.289*** 560.665 5.950 5.872 169.287 
                                                                                                     (30.758) (29.686) (373.675) (4.154) (6.394) (119.318) 
Observations                                                                                         16,872 16,872 16,872 15,921 15,921 15,921 
R^2                                                                                                  0.025 0.052 0.051 0.004 0.007 0.006 
adj. R^2                                                                                             0.024 0.049 0.050 0.003 0.003 0.005 
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
